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Political pressure often exists to earmark environmental tax revenues or permit rents to the industry
affectedbytheregulation. Thispaperanalyzesschemesthatrebaterevenuesbasedonoutputshares: tradable
performance standards, an emissions tax with market-share rebates, and tradable permits with output-based
allocation. All three policies effectively combine a tax on emissions with a subsidy to output. The result is
a shifting of emissions control efforts toward greater emissions rate reduction and less output contraction,
with higher marginal costs of control and lower output prices compared to the social optimum, given any
targeted level of abatement. These welfare costs depend on the degree of output substitutability and are
likely to be much larger in the long run. While some political and market-failure justiﬁcations may exist,
policy makers should carefully consider industry characteristics before engagingin output-basedrebating.
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Increasingly in recent years, countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) have been incorporating economic instruments into environmental policy. While the United States
hasemphasizedtheuseofmarketableemissionspermits,Europe,particularlyScandinavia,hasbeguntorely
onemissionscharges as a policytool. Bothtypesof policieshave the potentialfor raisingrevenues whilere-
ducing environmental externalities. However, contrary to the literature on “double dividends,” governments
do not tend to use revenues from environmental policiesto lower distortionarytaxes.
Tremendouspoliticalpressureevidentlyexiststoearmark environmentaltaxrevenuestoaid theindustry
affected by the regulation. The use of revenue earmarking to fund speciﬁc programs has been studied in
some depthby politicaleconomists.1 Traditionally,such publicﬁnance schemes tie an expenditure program
to a speciﬁc tax policy, effectively treating the latter as a user fee for the revenue needs of the program.2
However, recent policies aim to implement a tax policy for its incentive effects, while they tie the revenues
to offset some of the burdens to the regulated parties. These self-contained, revenue-neutral environmental
policies embed the earmarking directly into the environmental policy itself, using an allocation rule for
rebating revenues back to program participants.
One rebating method that is frequently advanced is to allocate revenues according to output. However,
since outputis a control variable of the ﬁrm, the allocationpolicy itselfhas behavioral effects, which in turn
0Fischer is a Fellow at Resources for the Future. This research beneﬁtted from support by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency;such support doesnot imply agreementwith the views expressedin the paper.
1See, for example,Wagner (1991).
2Examples of these traditional earmarking schemes abound in the OECD: revenue from fertilizer charges in Austria and Fin-
land help fund agricultural subsidies; France uses revenues from water pollution charges to fund discharge reduction and cleanup
projects; and the United States (theoretically) earmarks gasoline taxes for highway improvements (OECD 1994c).
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tends to reduce the efﬁciency of the environmental policy.
This paper focuses on three similar output-based allocation regimes: tradable performance standards,
tax rebates, andemissionspermit allocation. Whilethese policiesare not typicallyconsideredtogether, they
are indeed similar forms of the same scheme: they each simultaneouslyimpose a marginal cost to emissions
and offer a subsidyto output. Furthermore, the marginal value of that subsidyis tied to the average value of
inframarginal emissions to the affected industry.
While such output-based rebating policies do not yet abound, examples do exist, and they are gaining
in popularity among environmental policymakers. An explicit program of tradable performance standards
was implemented in the United States for the phasedown of lead. In 1982, the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency set an inter-reﬁnery average for lead usage among importers and reﬁneries producing leaded
gasoline.3 Reﬁneries using less lead than the standard could sell these credits to others using more than
average. Another less obvious example of tradable performance standards are the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards for automobile producers. Since each manufacturer must meet a ﬂeet average
miles-per-gallonstandard, this regulatory program is similar to an intra-ﬁrm tradable performance standard.
One tax-rebate scheme has recently received some attention in policy circles. In 1990, the Swedish
government announced the implementation of an environmental charge on nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions
beginning in 1992, Sweden’s ﬁrst tax based on actual emissions. The revenue is rebated to the affected
plants in proportionto the amount of energy produced. The tax is intended to promote emissions reduction,
while the rebate is intended to ameliorate the distributionalimpact of the tax since only large producers are
affected.4
Similarly, output-based allocation has surfaced recently as a proposed rule for distributing emissions
permits in a cap-and-trade system. In the United States, as tradable emissions permit systems are being
discussedfor a variety of pollutants,includingcarbon dioxide(CO2)a n dN O x, allocationregimes often rise
in the policy debates to the level of importance of the regulatory constraints themselves. The type of policy
3This standard was 1.10 grams per leaded gallon (gplg). In 1985, permit banking was introduced as the standard was reduced
to 0.50 gplg and ultimately 0.10 gplg in 1986. The trading program ended in 1988. (U.S. EPA 1997).
4The rate of 40 Swedish kroner per kilo (about $2.80/lb) was set to approximate the cost of reducing (and asserted to be the
marginal damage of) NOx emissions. The charge applies only to large combustion plants, since the measurement equipment is
costly. Initially, the program applied to heat and power producers with a capacity of over 10 MW and production exceeding 50
GWh. The latter threshold was to be lowered to 40 GWh in 1995 and 25 GWh in 1997 (Swedish Ministry of the Environment
and Natural Resources 1995). Only ﬁnal energy producers are included, not industrial process burning. The original participating
installations were responsiblefor about 6:5% of total Swedish NOx emissions (OECD 1994c).Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 3
envisioned in this paper is one like that proposed by Lashof (1997) for a broad-based cap-and-trade system
for CO2. Each sector would be granted a ﬁxed number of permits, and within each sector, individual ﬁrms
would receive permits proportional to their share of their industry’soutput.
In the next section, we develop a simple model to compare the socially optimal environmental policy
to tradable performance standards, the basic example of output-based earmarking. The implications of
output-based distribution of environmental revenues are then discussed for the speciﬁc cases of taxes and
permits. Section 3 discusses some of the reasons for outputsupport and evaluates some of the output-based
earmarking policies in practice. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2M o d e l
Thissectionpresentsthe optimalallocationof outputand emissionsrates thata socialplannerwouldchoose
and compares them to the choices made by a ﬁrm facing an emissions policy with output-based revenue
rebating. A simple, partial-equilibriummodel is employed, using a representative ﬁrm. Some of the limita-
tions of this approach will be discussed later, as other papers address issues of general equilibrium effects
and of imperfect competitionand costheterogeneity. However, we chooseto begin withthe minimal model
to capture the fundamental incentives of output-based rebating in a single, perfectly competitive industry.
The representative ﬁrm is assumed to be a price taker both in product and in emissions markets. Total
emissions E are composed of the emissions rate  times total output Q. Marginal costs of production
c() are constant in output but a decreasing function of emissions rate: c() > 0, c0() < 0, c00() > 0.
Environmentaldamages G(),ontheotherhand,areanincreasing,weaklyconvexfunctionoftotalemisions:
G(E) > 0 and G0(E) > 0 for E>0 ;G 00(E)  0.
2.1 Optimal Policy
The social planner aims to maximize welfare, which is composed of consumer surplus net of production
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where P(Q) is the inverse demand function.
Iftheplannerwere settingemissionsratesdirectly,shewoulddoso accordingto thefollowingﬁrst-order
condition:5
−c0()=G 0( E ) ; (2)
where E = Q.
The left hand side of this equation represents the marginal cost of reducing emissions via the emissions
rate.6 Thus, Equation (2) just restates the familiar ﬁnding that the marginal cost of emissions reduction
should equal the marginal cost of the externality.
Meanwhile, the planner wouldset outputlevels such that the marginal beneﬁts of another unit of output
(the price), less the marginal productioncosts, just offset the marginal damage caused by the emissions that
the additionalunit of output wouldgenerate:
P(Q) − c() − G0(E)
i =0 : (3)
In other words, she wants the output price to equal marginal social cost, inclusive of the emissions cost
embodied in that extra unit of output.
Economists since Pigou in 1938 have shown that pricing emissions, such as with a tax, can internalize
the externality. A tax of t = G0(E) in a decentralized equilibrium would produce the optimal allocation
from the planning problem. All three policies in this paper create a marginal price for emissions. However,
the additionof a subsidyhas efﬁciency consequences.
2.2 Tradable Performance Standards
The basic case of output-based rebating can be effectively represented by tradable performance standards.
With tradable performance standards, the average emissions rate is ﬁxed by policy. To the extent a ﬁrm
produces with emissions rates below the standard, that ﬁrm creates permits which it can sell; to the extent
the ﬁrm produces with above-average emissions, it must purchase permits to cover the gap. The subse-
5This condition assumes that the marginal cost of reducing the emissions rate is not prohibitive at the no-policy emissions rate.




q .Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 5
quent equilibrium determines the price of emissions and total amount of emissions, such that the industry
emissions rate average equals the performance standard.
This policy displays elements of both the tax-rebate and output-allocated permit schemes: As with
permits, the effective emissions price is determined by the market. But as with taxes, the overall level of
emissions is not ﬁxed and varies with the market equilibrium.
Let  representtheprice of emissionspermitsundera tradableperformance standard. Theﬁrm mustbuy
permits to the extent it emits more than the standard,  , which determines the industry’saverage emissions
rate. In other words,the ﬁrm pays an emissionstax of qand receives a subsidyequal to the average value
of emissions embodied in its output, q.
Consider our representative ﬁrm with constant marginal costs. Its proﬁts now equal total revenues from
the sale of output less the costs of production,less emissions costs net of the rebated subsidy:
S =( P−c (  )−( −  ))q: (4)
Maximizing proﬁts, the ﬁrm lowers its emissions rate until the marginal cost per unit of output equals
the marginal price of emissions:
−c0()=: (5)
Furthermore, theequilibriumoutputpricemustequalmarginalcostspluspermitcostsnetofthesubsidy:
P = c()+( −  ) : (6)
Note that while (5) resembles the planner’s ﬁrst-order condition for the emissions rate (2), the ﬁrm’s
marginal incentives for output (6) differ from those of the planner (3). For the same level of output, the
ﬁrm’s marginal proﬁts with respect to output are higher by the amount of the average subsidy, .
Let equilibrium values for the tradable performance standard regime be denoted by the superscript S.
In a closed equilibrium, compliance with the performance standard implies S =  ; correspondingly, the
permit price equals the marginal abatement cost at that standard:  = −c0( ). Furthermore, the marginal
permit price just equals the marginal subsidy per unit of output, so the equilibrium output price just equalsResources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 6
marginal productioncosts, much as itwouldwithno regulation. However, compliancewiththeperformance
standard raises marginal production costs compared to the no-regulation case (superscript 0); i.e., PS =
c( )>c (  0)=P 0.
Total productionin the market equilibriumis determined by consumer demand. The higher price result-
ing from the regulation corresponds to a lower level of output than in the absense of regulation; however,
since the price does not include the marginal environmental cost of the emissions embodied in remaining
production, outputwill be higher than in the socially optimal case.
Suppose the performance standard is set at the socially optimal rate, S = = . Emissionsrates and
prices will then equal the Pigouvian rates ( = t). However, the equilibrium output price will be lower;
thus, output will exceed Pigouvian levels (QS >Q  ). Consequently, emissions will also exceed optimal
levels (SQS > Q ). In other words, given any emissions rate, output-basedrebating induces less total
emissionsreduction.







Figure 1 portrays the excess burden of tradable performance standards compared to optimal emissions
pricing. This area equals the environmental damages from excess production ((QS −Q)), less the
correspondingconsumer surplus.
While the main characteristics of tradable performance standards—e.g., the output subsidy and the
highermarginal costof emissionscontrol—are common to all output-basedrebatingschemes, the particular
policies do have speciﬁc differences. Obviously, each one ﬁxes a different policy variable: average rate ofResources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 7
emissions, the price of emissions, or the total amount of emissions. Consequently, the equilibrium effects
of the policies may differ. Relaxing the assumption of perfect competition can cause the individual ﬁrm
incentives under the different programs to vary as well, but this case is not considered here.7
2.3 Output-RebatedEmissions Taxes
Thispolicycombines an emissionstax withan output-basedallocationof the revenues toachieve a revenue-
neutral environmental policy, much like the Swedish NOx program. Formally, let t represent the tax on
emissions. Total tax revenue is rebated back to ﬁrms according to theirshareofindustryoutput;theresulting
















it followsthat the marginal outputsubsidyimplied by the rebate equals the average per-unit subsidy.8 Thus,
for our representative ﬁrm, the tax-rebate scheme looks just like the tradable performance standard:
T =

P − c()− t( −  T)

q: (10)
The difference is that the marginal price of emissions is now ﬁxed while average industry emissions (the
performance standard) is endogenous.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization thus look the same as under standards. The marginal
cost of emissions reduction equals the marginal price of emissions (−c0()=t ). Meanwhile, the equilib-
7Fischer (2000a) examines the case when a ﬁrm’s market shares among program participants are signiﬁcant, either due to
imperfect competition or imperfect participation.
8The assumption of perfect competition for the purposes of this paper implies negligible market share, i.e. qi=Q  0,w h e r eQ













See Fischer (2001) for the analysis with signiﬁcantmarket share.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 8
rium output price equals marginal costs plus permit costs net of the subsidy, or P = c()+t ( −  T) .
In equilibrium (denoted here by superscript T), we see that for the same simple constant-costcase with
Pigouvian emissions pricing (setting t = t), the tax-rebate scheme functions just like the tradable permit
scheme. The ﬁrst-order condition for the emissions rate −c0(T)=t implies T = , and the marginal
subsidycancels the marginal tax on output: PT = c().9
2.4 Output-AllocatedPermits
As just seen, with rebated emissions taxes and tradable performance standards, optimal emissions rates
and prices lead to greater than optimal emissions. The dual to this problem is that to achieve the same
level of emissions as the optimal case, the regulator must then take into account the greater output and
tighten the performance standard. Correspondingly, the marginal price of emissions must rise. Thus, for a
given amount of emissionsreduction, output-basedrebating raises the marginalcost of emissionsreduction
relative to efﬁcient policy.
Toillustratethisresult,considerthecase ofoutput-allocatedemissionspermits. Let γ representtheprice
of an emissions permit. Permits totalling  E are allocated among program participants according to output





where  e   E=QP.
As in the preceding section, the assumption of perfect competition implies that the individualﬁrm does
not perceive an impact on the industry average allocation of its own production behavior. Thus, we can
simply write proﬁts for our representative ﬁrm as revenues less productioncosts less the value of net permit
purchases:
 =( P−c (  )−γ( − e ))q: (12)
As with the other policies, the ﬁrm equalizes the marginal cost of emissions rate reduction with the
marginal price of emissions: −c0()=γ . And the equilibrium output price equals marginal costs plus
9However, if entry or signiﬁcantmarketshares among participants were presentin the model, this equivalencewould be lost.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 9
permit costs net of the subsidy:
P = c()+γ( − e ) : (13)
However, the equilibrium prices and subsidy will differ from the preceding two scenarios, as both are en-
dogenous now. Furthermore, they will vary according to the industry’s place in the overall permit market
structure. The importantdistinctionisthatthe subsidyis nota functionof theindustryaverage emissionrate
but rather the average allocation.
Restricted Permit Market
Let us deﬁne the restricted permit market as one where all the ﬁrms participating in the permit market
compete in a single allocation pool. Let us also assume that ﬁrms remain price-takers. Total emissions for
the restricted market are ﬁxed at the Pigouvian level of overall emissions.
Inthiscase, theaverage permitallocationequalsaverage emissionsintheself-containedpermitprogram,
and  eP =  P . Given that QP >Q due to the presence of the output subsidy, to achieve the required
emissions level, average emissions rates will have to be lower:  P < . As a result, permit prices will be
higher, reﬂecting the higher marginal cost of control: γP = −c0(P) > −c0().








Figure 2 shows the excess burden of output-allocated permits compared to the social optimum. The
dead-weight loss occurs in two parts: (i) higher-than-optimal production costs ((c(P) − c())QP), and
(ii) thedamages impliedbyemissionsfrom the excess production,lessthe correspondingconsumer surplus.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 10
In other words, even though total emissions are at their optimal level, the marginal damages from output
still exceed the marginal beneﬁts.10
Broad-Based Permit Market
Now suppose permits are traded across a market that is much broader than the group of ﬁrms in the par-
ticular allocation pool. For example, a particular sector with output-based allocations could compete in a
multisectoral market for greenhouse gas permits. To consider the industry-level effects, let us assume for
now that the broad market is otherwise efﬁcient and γB = t.
In the simple case with constant marginal costs, optimal emissions pricing implies that emissions rates
under the broad scheme equal the optimal rate, or B = . However, the per-unit allocation,  e,n o
longer equals industry average emission rate. Suppose policy makers choose  E = Q to reﬂect opti-
mal emissions for that industry. Because of the presence of a subsidy, QB >Q and, correspondingly,
EB >E  . However, this implies that the average allocation rate is less than the average emission rate:
 eB = Q=QB < . This result in turn means the implicit average subsidy (t  E=QB)i sl e s st h a nw i t h
thecomparable tradableperformance standard. Thesmalleroutputsubsidythenimplieshigheroutputprices
and lower equilibrium output than with tradable performance standards, or QB <Q S. Correspondingly,
equilibriumemissions will also be lower (althoughstill greater than optimal), as EB <E S.
2.5 Comparison
Table 1 summarizes the results from this section and compares the effects of the different rebating policies.
In summary, output-based rebating shifts emissions reduction efforts toward emissions rate reduction and
away from output substitution. This higher marginal cost of control is reﬂected in a higher permit price (or
higher tax) and lower performance standard for any given amount of emissions reduction.
The combination of the preceding points implies an equilibrium departing from social efﬁciency, with
too much productionand too much effort toward reducing emissions rates. Compared to the absence of any
10This picture actuallyslightly underrepresentsthis loss. It assumesin effectthatthere is no differencein the socialmarginalcost














2 < 0. In other words, in the distorted equilibrium, the social marginal cost is somewhat higher than in
the optimal equilibrium, accordingto the convexity in the abatementcostfunction.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 11
Table 1: Comparison of Earmarking Schemes: Policy Effects
Policy  P E
Optimal Policy  c()+t   E 
Tradable Performance
Standards
S =  c() ES >E 
Tax-Rebate T =  c() ET = ES >E 
Output-Allocated
Permits: Restricted










E S >E B>E 
regulation, of course, outputwillstillbe lower. Correspondingly,the equilibriumoutputprice willbe higher
than in the no-regulation case but lower than in the ﬁxed-distribution case. Thus, output-based rebating
mitigates the rise in the equilibrium outputprice due to regulation.
Although we have used the emissions rates and taxes from the optimal scenario as the basis of com-
parison for the rebating scenarios, it is important to note that they are not optimal when one imposes the
constraint of rebating. Choosing a tradable performance standard is a second-best welfare maximization
problem, as output essentially becomes a function of the standard in the decentralized market equilibrium.
In the modiﬁed planner’s problem, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to output is not satisﬁed, so inResources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 12




(P − c()− G0(E)) = 0: (14)
Using P(Q)=c (  )and simplifying,









Thus, the second-best performance standard will tend to be higher according to the elasticity of output with
respecttotheemissionsrate. Thatelasticityispositiveanddependsonthedemand andcostfunctions.11 The
intuitionis that, with a performance standard rather than a direct price to emissions, emissions embodied in
outputescape taxation. Thestandardmust thendoextra worktoreduce emissions,bothdirectlybyreducing
the emissions rate further and indirectly by raising costs and reducing output.
2.6 Multi-Sector Permit Markets
Since many pollutants are emitted from a variety of activities and rarely just a single sector, it is worth
devoting some attention to the issue of multiple sectors and output-based rebating. Performance standards
are almost invariably speciﬁc to the activity being performed. Conceivable policies of tradable performance
standards or tax-rebate schemes for multiple sectors would always have the average emission rate in each
sector equal to its standard (or average allocation). As just presented, each sector would emit more than
they would with the Pigouvian tax alone, and sectors with greater elasticities of demand will over-emit to a
greater extent. A combined cap-and-trade program, besides ﬁxing overall emissions, raises some different
issues since the cross-sector trade in permits breaks the link between average emission rates and average
allocations.12
An actual output-based emission permit program is likely to display elements of each of the permit
11A caveat is the partial-equilibrium nature of this model. Bernard, Fischer and Vielle (2001) perform second-bestanalysis in a
general equilibrium framework. They ﬁnd that the optimal tax (and thereby emissions rate) when 100% rebating is imposed may
be higher or lower, dependingon the elasticity of substitution betweengoods,the emissionsrate of the othersector, and whetheror
not the other polluting sector can be regulated.
12The question of what happensunder a single cap-and-trade program is similar to the question of how to set standards or taxes
for each sector in order to achieve an overall emissions target. However, it is not identical, since a permit system restricts the
per-unit marginal cost of emission rate reduction to be equal acrosssectors.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 13
scenarios presented in section 2.4. Consider a broad-based market in which each sector allocates its own
pool of permits according to output shares.13 By the same logic as the restricted market model, equilibrium
permit prices in the broad market must be higherthan optimal, since outputsubsidiesrequire more emission
rate reductionand highermarginal costsof emissionscontrol. If the sectorsare notidentical—thatis, if they
display different cost structures, emissions, or demand elasticities—the implicit subsidies and their effects
will vary. Then, as in the broad-based market example, the average allocation will not necessarily reﬂect
average emissions in each sector, and each will tend to over- or undershoot their optimal emissions targets.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider this simple but extreme example: two sectors
compete in a single permit market, each with output-based allocation of permits within the sector, but one
sector has perfectly inelastic demand.
Let Sector 1 be that sector; its total allocation equals 
1Q
1, and since the equilibrium output level does
not change, its average allocation always equals 
1. It then has an outputprice of
P1 = c(M
1 )+γM( M− 
1): (16)
Meanwhile, Sector 2 faces more elastic demand. It receives a total allocation of 
2Q
2, which will
correspond to an average allocation of 
2Q
2=QM
2 . The price in that sector then equals
P2 = c(M














and that marginal costs of reducing emission rates per unit of output must be equalized at the permit price:
−c0(M
1 )=− c 0(  M
2 )=γ M: (19)
13The term “sector” is used, but the analysis applies to any group of ﬁrms sorted into a single allocation pool. The assumption
of perfect competition requires that their output not have a perfect substitute with producers in another allocation pool, as any
difference in the effective subsidywould wipe out a group.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 14
Start at the point of socially optimal emission rates and production. Any price can correspond to the
optimal quantity in Sector 1, but in Sector 2, at a price of P2 = c(
2) <c (  
2 )+t  , a greater quantity
will be demanded: QM
2 >Q 
2. The emissionsembodied in the extra outputwouldviolate the cap, so permit





the cap, Sector 1 will then emit less than the socially optimal amount, while Sector 2 will emit more.
Compare this equilibrium to separate restricted permit markets. Permit prices in a market restricted
to Sector 1 would reﬂect optimal control costs; permit prices in Sector 2 would reﬂect much higher-than-
optimal control costs. The broad-based permit price would then fall in between, with Sector 1 lowering




For Sector 2, lower permit costs and control costs mean consumer prices are even lower than in the
restricted permit market case.14 Consumer prices in Sector 1 must also be lower; according to the ﬁrst-order
condition for proﬁt maximization, if a ﬁrm wants to decrease its emission rate below P
1 = 




1)<c (  
1) . Essentially,higher permit prices raise the value of the subsidywhich
depresses consumer prices.
Figure 3 shows the product market equilibrium ineach sector when the same output-based allocation is
used in permit markets restricted to each sector compared to a broad market allowing permit trades between
sectors. The shaded areas represent efﬁciency losses compared to the social optimum. The patterned areas
represent transfers. With separate permit markets, consumers in the sector with inelastic demand reap the
full beneﬁt of the outputsubsidy,but efﬁciency is not affected.15 In Sector 2, the efﬁciency losses described
in section 2.4 apply. When these sectors are then allowed to trade permits, Sector 1 reduces its emission rate
and is more than compensated by the subsidy transfer. Sector 2 raises its emission rate and buys permits,
ﬁnding that cheaper than abating on its own.







































which violates the original premise. The second step follows from the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization with respect to





15Without the possibility of output substitution, the subsidy becomes like a lump-sum payment, equivalent in welfare terms to
raising the revenue in an auction and redistributing it backin a lump sum, although the particular recipients might not be the same.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 15








































Taken from another view, output-basedallocationscreate false gainsfromtrade. The resultis that trade
lowers prices for output in both sectors compared to separate permit markets. Recall the current assumption
that each sector gets allocated exactly the permits it would need, so under an optimal policy (or lump-sum
allocation) no net trade between sectors would be necessary. Restricted permit markets with output-based
allocation raise marginal abatement costs according to how much outputsubstitutionwouldnormally occur,
creating abatement cost differentials across sectors according to the elasticities of demand in those sectors.
Thus, ina multi-sectorpermit market withoutput-basedallocations,sectors withrelativelyinelasticdemand
functions realize a comparative advantage in abatement arising, in a sense, from their greater ability to pass
costs along to consumers.
But what about total welfare compared to restricted permit markets? (We know by deﬁnition the multi-
sector market with output-based allocation must be suboptimal in the absense of other market distortions.)
Overcompliance in Sector 1 represents a real resource cost. Sector 2 does reduce its overcompliance withResources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 16
respecttoemissionratereductions,whichsavessome formerly wastedresources, butitsoutputprice reﬂects
even less of the cost of the embodied emissions. As the costs of reducing emission rates are presumably
convex, cost savings will arise from spreading overcompliance across the sectors. Thus, the question is
whether those savings outweigh the additional efﬁciency loss from more overproduction in Sector 2. A
general equilibriummodel is then needed to estimate the resultingsectoral shiftsin compliance burdensand
theimpactonoverall costsof emissionregulations.16 Thesetechniquesbecome evenmore usefulingauging
the equilibriumwelfare effects when other market imperfectionsare present, as willbe discussedinthe next
section.
3 Support for Output
Environmental policy, of course, does not operate in a vacuum. The efﬁciency of a standard Pigouvian tax
or an equivalent emissions permit system relies on the assumption that markets are not otherwise distorted.
Where distortions exist, environmental policy may exacerbate them, rendering simple Pigouvian policies
suboptimal. Four major examples come to mind: (i) imperfect competition, (ii) imperfect participation,(iii)
tax interaction, and (iv) innovation externalities. However, in no case is output-based rebating likely to be
the best response.
For animperfectlycompetitiveindustrythatalreadyunderprovidesoutput,anenvironmentalpolicywith
an output subsidy could raise welfare. In essence, two problems exist: insufﬁcient output due to imperfect
competition and overproduction of emissions due to the externality. Thus, two policy tools are needed to
address them both, one to internalize the externality and one to encourage output.
A similar problem exists when the environmental program exempts signiﬁcant portions of an industry
(for example, if small producers do not need to participate). Since they bear no environmental burden,
excluded producers suddenly have relatively low costs compared to participants. Industry production will
then tend to shift away from participants toward non-participants (who are still emitting costlessly). An
output subsidyfor participants woulddiscourage such intra-industryshiftingof production and emissions.
However, in both these cases an outputsubsidytied one-to-one to revenues is invariablynot the optimal
16This general equilibrium analysis is performed in Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle (2000).Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 17
one and could be worse than no subsidy at all. First of all, it is tied to the value of inframarginal emissions,
not to the degree of output underprovision or to the environmental impact of output shifting. Bernard,
Fischer and Vielle (2001) assess the optimal tax and subsidy rates in several second-best settings when one
sectorof pollutersare difﬁculttoregulateor tax. They ﬁndthatwhenan emissionstaxcannotbe imposedon
one sector, thenext bestpolicyistotax thatsector’soutputandnotrebate anythingtotheregulated sector. If
an outputtax is notpossibleeither for the unregulated sector, then rebating is onlywarranted in cases where
the goods are close substitutes.
Second of all, if the industry is imperfectly competitive (or program participation restricted), market
shares will certainly be non-negligible, making the marginal subsidy endogenous to the output decision.
Fischer (2001) addresses these issues. Different effective tax and subsidy rates result if ﬁrms are hetero-
geneous, and output (and emissions rate reduction) can be shifted inefﬁciently toward high-cost ﬁrms. As
a consequence, overall costs—and perhaps overall emissions—would rise. Additional distortions arise if
ﬁrms are not price takers. In general, therefore, where outputsupport for program participantsis warranted,
that policy is best decoupled from the environmental policy.
Thethirdexample isthedistortionoflabormarketsbyincometaxation. Taxinglaborincomedistortsthe
labor-leisure tradeoff; in a sense, it taxes all consumptiongoodsat the same rate, making them more expen-
sive and making consuming leisure more attractive relative to consuming goods. Adding an environmental
policy that makes some consumptiongoods even more expensive further distortsthis tradeoff.
Environmental policies that raise revenues that can be used to lower distorting labor taxes unambigu-
ously raise welfare from the no-policy scenario. However, the optimal environmental tax (or auctioned
permit price) in this second-best setting is still less than the Pigouvian tax.17 Policies that do not raise
revenue (like grandfathered permits) must have positive environmental beneﬁts that outweigh the increased
deadweight loss from the labor tax on the margin.18
By providing a subsidy to output, output-based rebating may mitigate some of the impact of the tax
interaction effect compared to lump-sum redistribution. The implicit subsidy lowers the price of the dirty
good, making goods consumption in general less expensive and real wages higher. However, the gain from
17This result is well establishedin the literature: Bovenberg and van derPloeg (1994); BovenberganddeMooij (1994);Fullerton
(1996); Bovenberg and Goulder (1996); Parry (1995).
18See Parry (1996); Parry, Williams and Goulder (1996); Goulder, Parry, Williams and Burtraw (1997).Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 18
a reduced disincentive must be balanced against the higher abatement cost of achieving the same level
of emissions reduction. The net result may (or may not) be an improvement over distributed permits in
this situation.19 Bernard, Fischer and Vielle (2000) evaluate a system of CO2 permit trading in a general
equilibrium framework, where each sector allocates its permits based on output shares. They ﬁnd that the
rules for determining initial sectoral allocations are important: Sectoral distributionsbased on value added
generate effective subsidies more like a broad-based tax reduction and outperform lump-sum allocations.
Distributionsbased on other rules like historic emissions create different and more distorting subsidiesand
underperform grandfathering. Still, in all cases output-based rebating is strictly less efﬁcient than regular
emissions taxes or auctioned permits. These policies raise revenues that offset labor taxes and encourage
more work, and they achieve this in a manner that does not distort the relative prices of dirty and clean
goods.
Finally, externalities in the provision of R&D can affect the optimal choice and stringency of environ-
mental policy.20 Proponentsof output-basedrebatingview the subsidyas an added incentivefor innovation.
However, in the absense of the rebates, output prices would be higher and provide that extra incentive. To
the extent output-based rebating raises compliance costs, it does then raise some incentives for innovation.
Buttotheextentanyinnovationforloweringemissionsratesiswidespreadenough,itwillnotonlylowertax
(or permit) costs, but also lower rebate values. The latter effect tends to diminish incentives for innovation
relative to efﬁcient policy.21 Innovation is also impacted on the demand side: for example, if energy prices
do not rise as much, less demand exists for developing energy-saving technologies. Thus, output-based
rebating is not likelyto provide as strong incentivesfor innovationas efﬁcient, market-based environmental
policies.
19Goulder et al (1998) show that performance standards can generate fewer efﬁciency costs than distributed permits in this
second-best system. In their model, performance standards are less costly the less abatement is to be done by output adjustment
than by emissions rate adjustment. On the other hand, Jensen and Rasmussen (1998), using a general equilibrium model of the
Danish economy, ﬁnd that allocating emissions permits according to output dampens sectoral adjustment but imposes greater
welfare costs than grandfatheredpermits.
20See Fischer,Parry, and Pizer (1998).
21See Fischer(1999).Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 19
4 Unexpected Entry and Exit
A ﬁnal caveat regards the issue of entry and exit from the regulatory program. In comparing policies de-
signed to inﬂuence emissions behavior, a well-known distinction between a tax and a subsidy is that ﬁrms
that may be unproﬁtableunder the former may be proﬁtable with the latter (Bramhall and Mills, 1966; Bau-
mol and Oates, 1988). Output-based rebating schemes effectively combine taxes and subsidies; as a result,
the problem of entry remains and becomes even more complicated. If program eligibilitycan be affected by
ﬁrm behavior, an opening for rent-seeking is created.
Output-based rebating policies raise issues of not only for long-run incentives to enter and exit the
industry, but also of short-run behavior like the altering of products or production to gain (in)eligibility.
This section concentrates on the latter problem. The costs of short-run rent seeking are likely to dominate
those from inefﬁcient long-run exit incentives for incumbants, particularly for limited-duration programs
(like the lead phasedown).
Exitisa commonproblemfor regulatoryprograms. Whileexitcan reﬂect ﬁrm unproﬁtabilityinthelong
run under socially efﬁcient prices, activities to gain exemption generally reﬂect economic inefﬁciencies. In
the case of these programs, ﬁrms with high emissionsrates (H) will be willingto engage in nonproductive
activities to become ineligible for program participation. They will pay up to (H −  ) per unit of output
(assuming negligible market share) to remain outside the program. These nonproductive costs can manifest
themselves in the form of foregone proﬁts. The Swedish program shows some evidence of this type of
exit activity. The initial cut-off for participation was boiler production of 50 GWh; several plants were
subsequentlynoted to maintain boilers with a productionof 48-49 Gwh.22
Entry,on the other hand, isa problem endemic to subsidies. Since allof theseprograms effectively offer
a subsidy to output, incentives to gain eligibility exist as long as the potential subsidy outweighs the tax
or permit cost. In other words, excluded ﬁrms with below-average emissions (L) will be willing to pay a
per-unit price of k up to ( −L)to join the program and get a share of the permit rents or tax rebates.
The lead phasedown is a prime example of the unexpected entry problem. Producers suddenly had the
incentive to take unleaded gasoline and add small amounts of lead to make the product eligible for creating
permits. Small, hard-to-regulate intermediaries came onto the scene, blending leaded gasoline with fuel
22The SwedishExperience,p. 46.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 20
alcohol to dilute lead content and generate permit credits. Thus, a new industryof blenders was born purely
out of this regulation.23
Not only do such non-productive activities represent direct welfare losses, but they can also affect the
market equilibrium of the rebated environmental policy. As ﬁrms enter, not only are rents shifted from
incumbentsto entrants, but the marginal subsidiesand permit prices are also affected. With free entry, ﬁrms
willcontinuetopaytojointheoutput-basedrebatingprogramuntilaverage emissionsand/ortheequilibrium
permit price adjust to equalize the rents to the costs of eligibility(i.e., until ( −L)=k ). The impact of
entry on the effectiveness and efﬁciency of the output-based rebating system ultimately depends on which
policy variable is ﬁxed.
Withtradableperformance standards,averageemissionsareset. Aslowemittersenter(andhighemitters
exit the program), the average baseline emissions rate falls, loosening the constraint on average emissions
and causing the price of permits to fall. As a result, less abatement is performed, due to the permit price
drop and exit. At the same time, the output subsidy falls as well; initial participants will then receive less
support, while entrants receive unintended output support.
With output-based rebating in a tax regime or a broad-based permit system, the price of emissions is
ﬁxed at the tax rate. As low emitters enter (and as high emitters exit), the average program emissions rate
falls, in this way lowering the output subsidy. Support is dissipated to the entrants; meanwhile emissions
price incentives for the remaining incumbents become more efﬁcient.24
Inthecaseofaself-containedsystemofemissionspermits allocatedaccordingtooutput,totalparticipant
emissions are capped. As low emitters enter, average emissions fall, lowering the marginal subsidy at any
permit price; incumbents then overcontrol to a lesser extent, tending to bring down the marginal cost of
control. Meanwhile, because total baseline emissions rise (unless entrants are non-emitters), the constraint
bindsmore, which tendsto raise equilibriumpermit prices. The combined effect on permit prices isunclear.
On the other hand, the effect is clear for exit: as high emitters exit, average emissionsfall and the constraint
loosens concurrently. This reaction tends to drive down both permit prices and output subsidies.
23By the endof 1985about600alcoholblenderswere participating, overwhelming the administrative infrastructure designedfor
fewer than 200 reﬁneries (EPA, 1997; Kerr and Mar´ e, 1996). Furthermore, while fuel alcohol can raise octane when blended with
gasoline, this method is not as cost-effective as using methyl tertiary butyl ether (MBTE), derived from methanol produced from
natural gas (GAO, 1997).
24If marketshareswithin the program are an issue,entry also causesmarketsharesto fall, thus tendingto eliminate discrepancies
between different effective tax rates.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 21
For intuition, it is useful to examine the extreme case, where non-emitters can enter costlessly and
high emitters cannot exit. In other words, let k =0and L =0 . In the context of the model in earlier
sections, we shouldnote that we have considered the incumbent industryas havingconstant marginal costs,
making the number of ﬁrms irrelevant. To keep the following thought experiment simple, let us maintain
this assumption and assume that, while other ﬁrms may enter the emissions program, they do not actually
enter the same product markets. In other words, while the entrants’ output may be eligible for emission
credits, it is not a substitute for the incumbents’ output (in fact, it may even be generated purely for rent-
seeking purposes). We therefore will focus on the share of entrants in the emissions market, rather than on
number of ﬁrms. Furthermore, that share will affect the product market equilibrium of the incumbents, but
only through the emissions market. Let  represent the fraction of program participants composed of these
entering non-emitters.
Table 2: Comparison of Earmarking Schemes: Entry










)+(  S−  ) E S !E 0














EB ! EResources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 22
Table 2 summarizes the effects on emissions rates, prices, and total emissions as the program share of
entrants grows approaches 1. In the limit of all the cases, average baseline emissions are driven to zero. The
tradable performance standard is thus met without any behavioral modiﬁcation (or reduction in emissions),
and the price of those permits is driven to zero as well. On the other hand, the tax-rebate case returns
to the standard Pigouvian tax for the initial participants, with revenues disbursed among the entrants as
the marginal subsidy is driven to zero. The same occurs with the broad-based permit system. In the self-
contained cap-and-trade system, since entrants do not add to overall emissions, the emissions constraint
remains the same; however, the marginal subsidy is driven to zero. The program then becomes like an
auctioned permit program to the incumbents, and permit prices fall to their efﬁcient levels. (Of course, if
entrants do not have zero emissions, and permits are not traded outside the participants in the allocation
program, entry causes the cap to bind more tightly, raising compliance costs of the incumbents as well as
dissipatingtheir subsidies.)
Thus, opportunities to manipulate eligibilitytend to undo the redistributive goal of output-based rebat-
ing. And in the case of performance standards, entry tends to undo the goal of emissions reduction itself.
With the other policies, such entry can push price incentives back toward efﬁcient levels, but this comes at
another efﬁciency cost if nonproductiveresources are expended to gain eligibility.
5 Conclusion
The intent of rebating environmental policy revenues is to mitigate the cost burden on participants; the
reasons may be equity, the prevention of production shifting to unregulated sectors, or plainly for political
support of the regulation. Output-based rebating is attracting attention because it provides a seemingly fair
rule of distributionof the policy rents and because it allows the allocations to respond to changes in market
conditionsover time.
However, output-based rebating sacriﬁces some of the efﬁciencies of market-based environmental poli-
cies. Allocating by market share essentially provides a subsidy to output, which creates a bias away from
conservation and toward emissions rate reduction. The result is a higher marginal cost of control, a lower
equilibrium output price, and a greater cost when achieving any given level of emissions reduction, com-Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 23
pared toan efﬁcientpolicy. The sizeof thewelfare lossfrom thisdistortiondependsonhowmuch emissions
would normally be reduced throughoutput substitution.
The desirability of output-based rebating as a dynamic allocation mechanism is compromised by the
fact that the accompanying distortionsgrow larger in the long run. Elasticitiesof substitutionin general are
larger in the long run; furthermore, to the extent these elasticities are endogenous, output-based rebating
lowers them by reducing the incentives to pursue opportunitiesfor substitutes.
Another thorny issue is not the tax, cap, or standard itself, but to what it applies. Before anything else,
regulators must ﬁrst deﬁne each product group. For delineations that are less obvious and products that are
lessuniform,specialinterestswillstandtogainorloseagreatdealbythedeﬁnition. Producersofgoodswith
relatively high emissions as byproducts would prefer their output be classiﬁed narrowly, so as to minimize
deviation and maintain a high standard and subsidy. Meanwhile those with relatively low emissions would
prefer a broader deﬁnition, grouping themselves with high emitters and a higher performance standard and
maximizing their permit allocation.
In a multisector market for permits with separate allocation pools, output-based allocation can create
gains from trade that would not otherwise exist. Although the model presented here is of different indus-
tries, the intuitioncarries over to other types of conﬁgurations: allocation pools might be geographic rather
than sector-speciﬁc; the rule might even be for shares of total value rather than total output. The bottom
line is that allocation based on production behavior creates a subsidy for that behavior, and differences in
market conditionsand allocationamounts create different effective subsidies. When permit trade is allowed
between the pools, the incentives to overcomply are spread around, possibly reducing overall distortions
from separate allocation incentives, but causing shifts in the distribution of compliance, costs, and prices
that would not occur with other, nondistortingallocation systems. These shifts raise the futher question of
how to set optimally the allotments (or standards or taxes) for each pool, given the different elasticities of
demand and supply;would a type of Ramsey Rule take effect?
Finally, in addition to assessments of economic efﬁciency, issues of administrative expediency deserve
mention. The information needed for implementing and enforcing a rebating scheme can be onerous. With
an emissions tax or auctioned permit system, the government need only monitor emissions. With output-
based rebating policies, the policy enforcer must know for each ﬁrm not only annual emissions, but alsoResources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 24
annual output and emissions by product. Furthermore, to achieve a target of emissions reduction, the pol-
icymaker must be able to forecast the equilibrium of both variables, inclusive of the effects of the implicit
subsidy.25
Thispaper thusinjectsthree major caveats intothe debate over output-basedrebating. The ﬁrst question
is, what are the opportunities for cost-effective output-substitution? For example, is energy demand highly
inelastic, or will correct price signals induce consumers to adopt energy-saving practices? The more re-
sponsiveis consumer behavior, the more wasteful is a subsidyprogram. Second, how difﬁcult is it to deﬁne
output and determing participating ﬁrms? If products are not uniform, or if eligibilityis malleable, the ef-
fectiveness of the emissions or redistributionprogram can be compromised and administrative costs raised.
Third, if imperfect participationis an issue, are the products of ﬁrms that cannot be regulated substitutesor
complements? Rebating is a reasonable way to maintain competitivenessvis-a-visunregulated ﬁrms only if
their products are very close substitutes.26
From the point of view of efﬁciency, preferred environmental policies use market incentives and collect
revenues with which the government can displace distortionary taxes. However, political realities must
be taken into account, and policy adoption may require containing the rents within the affected industry.
Output-based rebating can still clearly be preferable to command-and-control policies and no policy. But
does it outperform other politicallyfeasible allocation mechanisms? This question awaits better answers.
25Andif thepolicymakeris reactiveinstead,adjustingperformancestandardsoremissionscapssectorby sector,ﬁrmswill expect
to have more of an impact on future performance standards,and marketshare will again comeinto play, creating different effective
subsidiesfor different ﬁrms.
26The case of the Swedish NOx tax may exemplify a reasonable situation: electricity is a uniform, well-deﬁned product; its
demand is fairly inelastic; and smaller competing producers of the identical product were exempt from regulation due to ﬁxed
monitoring costs.Resources for the Future Carolyn Fischer 25
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